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How do political elites persist? Populist movements highlight the continued tension
between citizens and political elites. This article reviews some recent research on
political selection and inequality. I consider political inequality as the persistent
political selection of specific individuals or their relatives over time. Empirical historical
research employing statistical analysis of natural experiments can help to understand
the connection between specific democratic institutions, such as elections or lotteries,
and political selection, political behaviour, or political inequality over time. Some
democratic features enable elites to persist, yet there is much variation in political
inequality over time and space. Further research could aim to disentangle institutional
causes of this variation from determinants of institutional choice.




How do political elites persist? In this article, I review selected research on who
legislators are, how democratic institutions affect their selection and behaviour, as
well as their persistence over the long run. The extent to which political elites persist,
forms a measure of the level of political inequality between elites and citizens. I argue
that political inequality in societies can be measured as the extent to which the same
individuals, or families, monopolize political power. This operationalization travels
well through space and time. In extreme forms of non-competitiveness, power is
passed on within political dynasties, and power becomes essentially hereditary.
Democratic competition is meant to break up the extreme political inequality
associated with absolute, hereditary politics. We still insufficiently understand the
exact institutional reforms under which hereditary political selection declined during
European countries’ evolution towards representative democracy (e.g. Offerlé, 1993)
from the individual interests of those who decided to reform (Benoit, 2004, Capoccia
and Ziblatt 2010). Yet these questions were crucial for early elite theorists (e.g.
Michels ([1911] 1968), Mosca ([1896] 1939)) who warned that all power has a tendency
to become hereditary. To understand how institutions affect political selection,
and long-run political inequality, we need to understand why individuals support
(and largely continue to support)1 the institutional equilibriums that make up their
representative democracies. For this non-exhaustive review I draw on examples from
the study of political inequality and political selection, broadly defined, and present
some of my own recent contributions to this literature, about historical lotteries,
legislative elites, and political dynasties in France and Britain. The focus in this work
on highly unequal, early democratising countries addresses two important research
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challenges. First, we need to observe the evolution of political inequality over the
very long run. Second, political elites rarely experiment with drastic institutional
change for political appointments. They are unlikely to agree to experiment with
lotteries today. Empirical historical research might address some of these challenges.
This article sets out how we can think of political inequality as elite persistence:
The continuing political selection of particular types of elites. Recent studies refocus
on political elites as the central actors, e.g. on political dynasties. Such recent
empirical work on political elites often employs an historical, individual and quantitative
lens. Some of these studies revisit political history, and employ research designs
suitable to causal inference.2 Political inequality in democracies can persist through
individual incumbency advantages in elections and promotions, which are sometimes
even transferable to family relatives.
2 Political inequality through the lens of political
selection
Research on political elites is making a come-back after being out of fashion for
many decades. Most older studies considered political elites in temporal or spatial
isolation. This includes some seminal contributions on political elites from historians
and historical sociologists (e.g. Canandine, 1999, Offerlé, 1993, Rush, 2001, Wasson,
1991). With the maturation of mass democracy, the focus moved from political
elites to understanding the constraints on their actions, e.g. parties, movements, and
institutions, and the quality of representation. In representative democracies, citizens
do not participate directly in forming policy, but instead periodically select political
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elites in elections to represent their interests (Manin, 1997). So, scholars concerned
with levels of political inequality in representative democracies have traditionally
conceptualized such inequality as representation, the extent to which politicians form
a mirror image of the groups of citizens they represent.
2.1 Political inequality and representation
Democracy as we know it today is representative democracy; individuals periodically
elect others to represent their interests rather than participate directly in forming
policy. Representative democracy and elections as mechanism for political selection
emerged in the 19th century as autocratic elites agreed to open access to politics
(Ihl and Déloye, 1991, Sintomer, 2011). Individual direct participation in political
decision-making was impractical, and some would argue also unnecessary as long
as different interests were sufficiently represented. Yet do legislatures reflect the
societies they represent?
While the principle of ‘one (wo)man one vote’ in democracies sounds fair, political
scientists have spent decades studying how that equal stake is given very different
weights, depending on the institutional set-ups of countries or the behaviour of
for example interest groups. For example, there is a long tradition of studying
representation in parliament. Typically, political scientists have studied political
(in)equality as representation, and considered individual behaviour and background
characteristics like socio-economic or immigrant status (e.g. Norris, 2004, Pitkin
1967). Others have focused on the behaviour of legislators in their legislative roles
(Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012, Brouard et al., 2013). Yet which behaviour is
consistent with group as opposed to individual interests? Which groups warrant
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consideration if political equality is defined as representation? Despite offering crucial
insights on representative democracy, the approach has a number of limitations.
Cross-national research on representation is difficult, because how can we know
which characteristics are politically relevant?3 Characteristics that indicate ‘elite’ or
’unrepresentative’ status in one country do not necessarily do so in another country
or at a different point in time. Yet even within the same country and at a given
moment in time, it is unclear how much different individual characteristics matter:
Is it equally bad for representation if highly educated individuals are overrepresented
in parliament, than if certain regions of a country are under-represented? Finally, it is
complicated to infer from legislators’ behaviour that their decisions can be explained
by their individual background and interests, their party label, or their electoral
and career concerns (Krehbiel, 1993). Moreover, after having agreed on the relevant
interests to be represented in parliament, could there not be a trade-off between
representation and political quality or accountability?
While studying political inequality as representation is difficult, it is easier to say
what is not very convincingly democratic: concentration of power over time. In the
extreme scenario, a small number of individuals hold most of political power, and
are able to pass this power on to their relatives and friends with similar individual
characteristics.
2.2 Political inequality as concentration in political selection
I propose to consider political inequality as the temporal persistence of the same
political elites. I argue that political inequality can be measured as the extent to
which the same individuals, or families, monopolize political power in parliaments
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and executives. Persistence of individuals and families by definition runs counter
to representation. The benefit of this definition of political inequality is that it
can travel more easily through time and space. Comparing parliamentary political
dynasties across time and countries has only recently been made possible by advances
in data collection and methods of analysis. The study of political dynasties provides
underappreciated, comparative insights about representation, such as the link between
high levels of dynasties in parliaments, and the electoral system (see for example
Smith, 2018). In fact, the puzzle of whether and why elites moved away from
hereditary politics in democracies has long been recognized (e.g. Offerlé, 1993), but
remains insufficiently understood from the perspective of individual interests. The
Iron Law of Oligarchy posits that even in democracies power tends to be concentrated
in very few hands and we should expect that “every class has a tendency to become
hereditary, in practice if not in law” (Michels ([1911] 1968), Mosca, ([1896] 1939)).
An important research challenge for this literature is to disentangle institutional
effects from the determinants of initial choices.
Considering elites as a measure of political inequality is necessarily limiting, but
reflects a comparable shift to the study of top incomes to gain new insights into
economic inequality (Piketty, 2014). A focus on legislative and executive elites, and
how they are selected, is justified as these individuals ultimately set policy, and it
is the selection of these individuals that voters typically control in democracies. As
economic inequality increases, there is a broadly shared concern about the evolution
of political selection and whether present-day changes in the economic interests
of representatives are affecting democratic decision-making (McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal, 2005). Yet we need to define how economic and political inequality are
distinct, before we can consider to what extent they are related (Acemoglu et al.,
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2008). The study of the concentration of political power among the same or related
legislative elites offers a promising way forward.
Whether incumbency and political dynasties are always bad for democracy is
an open question. Yet it is clear that in its extreme form, democracy necessarily
disappears and only a narrow section of interests are represented: hereditary politics
reigns. How can we specify which type of political selection is adversarial for representation
in democracy? Principal-agent theory forms a framework that helps to understand
when and why representation by a narrow elite is problematic.
2.3 Political inequality and adverse political selection
In a principal-agent framework where voters select representatives to act in their
interest, it becomes clear that there are two main concerns that derive from information
asymmetries between representatives and the represented: moral hazard (a representative’s
behaviour), but also adverse selection (a politician’s group or type). If voters care
only about their representative’s behaviour, they should only care about a politician’s
type insofar as that affects their behaviour. In other words, who a politician is
should not matter beyond ”substantive representation” (Pitkin 1967). Indeed, in
a standard citizen-candidate model, citizen-candidates can only credibly commit to
implementing the policies preferred by citizens of the same group after they are
elected (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996, Besley and Coate, 1997). Yet if even individuals
from a given group can differ, because they are more or less capable of interpreting
their voters’ interests and they have better information about their type than voters,
then the problem of potential adverse selection becomes even more extensive. This
is particularly the case if some individuals, say those who hold more education, can
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more credibly signal that they will be ’good’ representatives.
So, beyond group identification, voters may also care about their representative’s
type if it includes an aspect of ’political quality’, for example how efficient they are at
’getting things done’. These individual aspects are often called valence characteristics
(Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2000, Schofield, 2003): characteristics that
everyone prefers more of in their representative, such as honesty, altruism, intelligence,
charisma. If politicians vary in such ‘political quality’, principal-agent theory can
help explain why adverse selection in political selection can exist as a result of the
institutional set-up (Besley, 2005). The wrong types of individuals may be attracted
to a career in politics, and deter other more talented or more honest newcomers from
entering. Equilibria of bad politicians, i.e. of low political quality, once established
can persist (Caselli and Morelli, 2000, Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007, 2008, Messner and
Polborn, 2004). In extreme scenarios, this could also lead to captured democracies,
whereby a small oligarchy takes only their own economic self-interest into account
in setting policy (Acemoglu, 2008). Some institutions may force voters to trade-off
quality and representation. For example, poor and middle-class voters may support
elite candidates, even though these can only credibly commit to their preferred policy
of low taxation and limited redistribution, if such elite representatives are at the same
time better able to secure pork for the voter’s district (Mattozzi and Snowberg, 2018).
Political quality in these theoretical contributions was generally assumed to be a
fixed characteristic, determined before a politician’s first entry. Yet political quality
is likely to increase over time with experience, or may only be revealed over time.
This means political selection must not only be considered at the time of election.
We must also study political selection over a legislator’s career, for promotions within
their party or within the legislature.
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If political selection of specific political types or qualities takes place repeatedly
over time, whether adverse or positive, it can result in high levels of political inequality.
That is, the political elites may be consistently drawn from similar backgrounds that
are different from the population as a whole. Political inequality can for example
manifest itself in the persistence of existing (pre-democracy) elites.
2.4 Does political selection matter?
Does it matter for political outcomes who politicians are? We know from a number of
studies that the identity of representatives, or their specific individual characteristics
like their caste, family composition in terms of gender, or eduction, influences the
policy choices they make (e.g. Pande, 2003, Washington, 2009, Besley and Reynal-
Querol, 2011). We also know that the set-up of democratic institutions, and specifically
the electoral system, matters for the types of individual characteristics that voters
select their representatives on. For example, when given a choice over individual
politicians from the same party label, voters tend to prefer representatives local to
their districts, particularly as these districts increase in size (Shugart, Valdini, and
Suominen, 2005).4 Yet political quality is difficult to measure, and studies have
approached measurement differently.
3 Determinants of political inequality
If political inequality can be measured by concentration among elites, we should
compare the effects of different selection institutions on such concentration over space
and time. It is notoriously difficult to distinguish the effects of democratic institutions
from the underlying, pre-existing inequalities of the societies that implement them.
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The limited variation in real-world institutions makes this challenge particularly
severe for comparative analysis. Democratic institutions are rarely drastically changed,
making it hard to establish that specific institutional change in itself reduces or
reproduces political inequality. Recent empirical contributions, using contemporary
and historical data, therefore increasingly employ quantitative analysis of natural or
quasi-natural experiments5 to address this research challenge.
3.1 Measuring political quality and political inequality
How should the political quality of political elites be measured, and compared?
Empirical research measuring political quality, like the literature on representation,
has to first decide which characteristics matter. Individual characteristics such as
localness, family background, or caste do not fully capture what we tend to think
that the political quality concept covers. Some have attempted to measure political
quality more directly, as years of schooling, previous political experience and previous
market income. Parties anticipating quality-seeking voters select higher quality
politicians, allow them to run in the most competitive districts, and place them in
the most competitive spots within the party list (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; 2015).
Some argue that democracies create higher growth than non-democracies precisely
because of the more limited variance in the quality of the leaders they select (Besley,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011), though others found that leaders’ education
was unrelated to corruption, legislative productivity or electoral success (Carnes and
Lupu, 2015).
Consider education as a measure of political quality. We know that entry to
elite education in many countries is still biased to those with parents who have
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enjoyed such an education themselves (e.g. Falcon and Bataille, 2018). Education
can offer existing elites a (for voters perfectly legitimate) comparative advantage over
newcomers. For example, this mechanism was found to explain the persistent over-
selection of ministers from certain regions with historically higher colonial education
rates in sixteen former British and French colonies (Ricart-Huguet, 2019). For the
United Kingdom, we analysed a large dataset of legislators between 1832 and 2010.
We found that a persistent and sizeable proportion of the parliament and cabinet
were educated not only at elite universities, but even at a much younger age at one
of the famous public schools, which still only allow entry to boys. Yet proportions
in the political elite remained remarkably stable over time, in spite of franchise and
candidate eligibilty extensions (Berlinski, Dewan and Van Coppenolle, 2015).
One of the most extensive recent attempts to measure political quality in this
literature compares all elected politicians to the population over three decades in
Sweden. Drawing on detailed individual information on social background, party
preferences, and test results on intelligence, income and leadership skills, evidence
is found for positive, not adverse, political selection from the population (Dal Bó
, Finan, Folke, Persson, and Rickne. 2017). Positive political selection is possible,
and even becomes stronger as competition increases. While these findings seem to
be reflected in recent work on Denmark (Dahlgard et al, 2019), the results are very
different in the United States (Thompson et al, 2019).
More work needs to be done in improving measures of political elite types, and
repeating the analysis in different settings, in order to understand how well results
on positive or adverse selection travel. Political selection of specific elites can result
in political inequality over time, via political careers, or incumbency and promotion.
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3.2 Elections and political careers
The political quality of those elected, perceived or real, could increase through time.
A long literature on the incumbency advantage confirms that experienced legislators
enjoy re-election advantages, at least partly because incumbency is viewed as a signal
of legislator political quality (e.g. Erikson, 1971, Gelman and King, 1990).
Theoretical reasons for the incumbency advantage range from the ability to
directly use the perks of one’s office to obtain re-election, to attracting more campaign
funding by signalling competence, or scaring off potential strong competitors (Erikson,
1971, Gelman and King, 1990, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008). For political
selection and political inequality, the question is to what extent incumbency provides
direct advantages that cannot be explained by political quality or its increase over
time. By comparing close winners to close losers in elections, and under the assumption
that winning is quasi-exogenously determined, we can assess the effect of winning
when quality differentials are close to zero.
To identify a causal impact of election on re-election, Lee (2008) first employed
such methods of causal identification to estimate the The incumbency advantage
typically measured in this and other natural experimental designs is the combined
personal and partisan incumbency advantage, e.g. the perks of holding office to aid
re-election, as well as the transferable advantage for an incumbent party (Erikson and
Titiunik, 2015). Yet by exploiting term limits to separate out personal and partisan
advantages, the partisan advantage was estimated to be near zero, suggesting that
parties cannot use their resources to advantage candidates succeeding party incumbents,
and that most of the incumbency advantage is personal (Fowler and Hall, 2014).
Eggers and Spirling (2015) further showed that the incumbency advantage is largest
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in contexts where partisan preferences are weak. Finally, recent work has also
started to identify institutional causes for incumbency advantages and disadvantages,
such as the influence of young regimes or weak parties (Klašnja, 2015, Klašnja and
Titiunik, 2017). Therefore, specific democratic institutions, among which party and
electoral systems, clearly affect the size of the incumbency advantage. Electoral
system minutiae have indeed long been recognized to affect re-election prospects. The
incumbency advantage can be larger or smaller depending on how much institutions
encourage the development of a personal vote (e.g. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and
Stewart, 2000, Gelman and King 1990, Blais, et al., 2011, Cain, Ferejohn, and
Fiorina, 1987) or strategic voting behaviour (Van der Straeten, Laslier, and Blais,
2013).
The evidence that parties can benefit from incumbency is limited, which indicates
that incumbency advantages are personal. This makes it all the more surprising
that in some contexts, incumbency advantages do seem to be transferable to family
relatives (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2005, Querubin, 2015, Fiva and Smith, 2015,
Smith, 2018, Van Coppenolle, 2017).6 The inter-personal, dynastic incumbency
advantage is an incumbency advantage that benefits the relatives of those who
narrowly won their (re-)election bids. Moreover, the inter-personal incumbency
advantage is larger in less party-centred, or elite-dominated, contexts that encourage
more personal voting, like the US, than Norway, the Philippines or the UK (Dal Bó,
Dal Bó, and Snyder, 2009; Cruz, Labonne and Querubin, 2017; Feinstein, 2010; Fiva
and Smith, 2017; Smith, 2012; Van Coppenolle, 2017).
Besides re-election, another important influence on a legislator’s political career,
affecting what she can do for her constituents in office, are party rules and parliamentary
procedures determining who will advance in the parliamentary or party hierarchy.
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What evidence is there on which individuals tend to be promoted? Once elected,
legislators who perform better tend to be promoted more quickly within the party
ranks, which is arguably not due to selection effects, but works through learning, or
increased political quality over time (Padro ı́ Miquel and Snyder, 2006, Wawro, 2000).
The evidence for the transferability of advantages within parliaments to relatives is
even more limited, but we know that relatives of previous cabinet ministers are more
likely to obtain cabinet seats (Martin and Smith, 2017, Van Coppenolle, 2017).
Given these strong incumbency advantages and lack of legislator turnover, the
discipline’s comparative lack of attention in the past to individual political elites as
opposed to parties, movements or institutions is perhaps unsurprising. Yet such lack
of turnover in political elites can indicate persistent political inequality. Dynastic
turnover can be expected to be lower in democracies, but was also found to vary
among democracies (see Smith, 2018). Can political quality differentials explain
such adverse or positive political selection over time, resulting from past institutional
choices? Given the strong influence that electoral institutions seem to have on
incumbency advantages, including the inter-personal incumbency advantage, isolating
institutional consequences of elections for political selection is important.
3.3 Selection beyond elections
Beyond elections, equally important for political inequality is how politicians are
selected for specific roles or for promotion after they enter parliament. There is a
long literature studying the history of parliaments, their procedures and rules (e.g.
Howe, 2010, Manow, Schroeder and Nickel, 2011, Koß, 2018), and of political careers,
for example of who gets to go on to serve as a government minister (e.g. Best and
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Cotta, 2000, Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding, 2007, Blondel and Thiébault, 1991).
Individual legislators are socialized into different roles (Blomgren and Rozenberg,
2012). Much of the chamber’s law-making activity takes place in smaller committees,
the selection of which is beyond voters’ direct control (Martin, 2014). Beyond
elections, both procedural and party rules affect what a legislator can do once in
office, immediately and over a long career.
Recent developments in this literature use natural experiments, and institutional
randomization, to study the connection between specific intra-parliamentary procedures
and politician selection and behaviour. They include the study of the relevance of
committee positions for future careers (Broockman and Butler 2015; Grimmer and
Powell 2013), the relevance of seniority rules for committee selection (Cirone et al.
2019; Kellermann and Shepsle 2009), or of lottery-based procedures (Cirone and
Van Coppenolle, 2018). The latter are important alternative selection mechanisms
to seniority or election within parliaments, that allow us to learn about different
selection institutions and their effects on political quality.
Studying such alternative selection mechanisms is crucial as some believe over-
reliance on elections for selection in representative democracies is one of its crucial
flaws (e.g. Van Reybrouck, 2016), explaining why our democracies are in crisis (e.g.
Grossman and Sauger, 2017), with persistent levels of political inequality. Elections
only became inextricably linked to the word democracy in the course of the 19th
century (Hayat, 2015, Ihl and Déloye, 1991, Rosanvallon, 1995, Sintomer, 2011), and
elites experimented with alternatives like lotteries (Manin, 1997, Cirone and Van
Coppenolle, 2019). We studied these lottery-based procedures for selection within
parliaments.
We first drew on an extensive dataset of legislators in the French Third Republic
15
to estimate the causal effect of committee service on legislative behaviour, re-election,
and further parliamentary and party careers. We exploited a natural experiment in
the French Third Republic (1870–1940), created by the yearly lotteries that divided
the legislature into groups that nominated members to the budget committee. We
found that committee appointment increased legislative entrepreneurship concerning
budget-related but not other types of legislation, suggesting specialized skill acquisition,
a measure of political quality. We also found career promotion specific to these
legislative skills (i.e. ministerial promotion, but not to the party leadership or
senate), but no effects on re-election. While we showed how lottery-based procedures
can still encourage skill acquisition, others have shown they have real policy consequences:
Considering lotteries for the selection of political leaders in the medieval city-state
of Florence, Abrahamson (2019) found that the randomly drawn leaders’ economic
interests affected the city’s exchange rates.
An additional advantage of these studies is that they show how alternative political
selection mechanisms work in real political settings (benefits have been shown in
experiments with citizens, see Dryzek et al, (2019)). Experiments with lotteries are
nearly impossible to conduct today, as elections confer legitimacy to the democratic
process, and political parties and elites have vested interests in controlling selection.
In a follow-up analysis of the use and abolishment of this lottery-based procedure,
we found that lotteries help to support weak party systems, while they tend to
be abolished once parties become stronger, and want to control legislator career
incentives (Cirone and Van Coppenolle, 2019). As democratic institutions are rarely
drastically changed, there is real benefit to understanding initial institutional consequences.
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4 Conclusion
Populist movements across democracies point at persistent tensions between political
elites and citizens. This article discussed formal and empirical research on the
selection of elites, their behaviour, and their persistence over the long run. Elites can
persist because incumbents tend to hold an advantage in election and promotion, and
because these benefits may be transferable to family relatives. Are these persistent
inequalities consequences of how democracies organize political selection? There
is much variation in the political quality of representatives, as well as in political
inequality, between countries and over time. Using historical data, recent work
attempts to isolate the institutional effects on political selection, which can increase
political inequality over time. How elections and legislative organization affect
dynastic persistence, compared to potential alternatives such as lotteries, is understudied,
and forms an important research agenda for those interested in political inequality.
Such empirical historical research could help distinguish institutional consequences
from original choices, and explain the origins of today’s democratic political institutions
from the perspectives of individual elites. If democratic institutional reform removed
hereditary selection, why did elites introduce these reforms? When is power inheritable,
when is it not, and what can institutions do? These questions are important in a
world of increasing economic inequality.
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Notes
1See Becher et al, 2017; Bedock, 2014, 2017; Koß, 2018 to understand individual
legislative, and executive support for (and obstruction of) institutional change in
representative democracies.
2Research designs for causal inference are now widely employed throughout the
social sciences (e.g. Banerjee and Duflo, 2009, Lee and Lemieux, 2010)
3It is likely that merely identifying a characteristic as politically relevant by
building representative institutions reflecting the divisions, makes it so.
4A decrease in the capacity to remember at least one representative’s name
indicates that such electoral system rules also affect how politicians campaign using
more individual messages (Van Coppenolle, 2017) under certain electoral rules.
5A natural experiment is a case where “the assignment of treatments to subjects
is haphazard and possibly random” (Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). These techniques
effectively exclude potentially confounding factors from the causal relation of interest.
This approach relies on a number of assumptions, which are not always met, but can
be supported by statistical tests (Eggers et al, 2015). A key limitation of natural
experiments is that the experiment is typically restricted to a particular context.
Therefore, careful interpretation of the external validity of findings across space and
time is essential.
6As measured by education levels, dynastic candidates were in some cases found
to be of lower political quality (Geys, 2017).
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[33] Dal Bó, E., F. Finan, O. Folke, T. Persson and J. Rickne. 2017. ’Who Becomes
A Politician?’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(4): 1877-1914.
[34] Dryzek, J. S., Bachtiger, A., Chambers, S., Cohen, J., Druckman, J. N.,
Felicetti, A., Fishkin, J. S., Farrell, D. M., Fung, A., Gutmann, A., Landemore,
H., Mansbridge, J., Marien, S., Neblo, M. A., Niemeyer, S., Setala, M.,
22
Slothuus, R., Suiter, J., Thompson, D. and Warren, M. E. 2019. ’The Crisis Of
Democracy And The Science Of Deliberation’, Science, 363(6432):1144-1146.
[35] Eggers, A. C. and A. Spirling. 2017. ‘Incumbency Effects and The Strength
of Party Preferences: Evidence from Multiparty Elections in the United
Kingdom’, The Journal of Politics, 79, no. 3 (July 2017): 903-920.
[36] Eggers, A., A. Fowler, J. Hainmueller, A. B. Hall and J. M. Snyder, Jr.
2015. ‘On the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design for Estimating
Electoral Effects: New Evidence from over 40,000 Close Races’, American
Journal of Political Science, 59 (1): 259-274.
[37] Erikson, R. S. 1971. ’The advantage of incumbency in Congressional Elections’,
Polity, 3 (3): 395-405
[38] Erikson and Titiunik, 2015. ’Using Regression Discontinuity to Uncover the
Personal Incumbency Advantage’, Quarterly Journal of Political science,
[39] Feinstein, B. D. 2010. ‘The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in Congressional
Elections’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 35: 571–98.
[40] Fiva, J. H and D. M. Smith. 2017. ‘Political Dynasties and the Incumbency
Advantage in Party-Centered Environments’, American Political Science
Review, 3 (112): 706-712.
[41] Fowler, A. and A. B. Hall, 2014. ’Disentangling the personal and partisan
incumbency advantages: Evidence from close elections and term limits’,
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 9 (4): 501–531.
23
[42] Gelman, A. and G. King. 1990. ‘Estimating the Incumbency Advantage
without Bias’, American Journal of Political Science, 34(4): 1142-1164.
[43] Geys, B. 2017. ‘Political Dynasties, Electoral Institutions and Politicians’
Human Capital’, The Economic Journal, 127: F474–F494.
[44] Grimmer, J. and E. Powell. 2013. “Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and
Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal.” The Journal of Politics,
75 (4): 907-920.
[45] Grossman, E. and N. Sauger. 2017. Pourquoi détestons-nous autant nos
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